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Classical economists were interested in macroeconomic issues, i.e. how the economy worked as a whole 
and how it grew over time. This is opposed to neo-classical economists, which focus on decision-making 
processes of individuals and individual firms. This thesis sets out to examine how that change occurred and 
what it means for the way that economics studies the environment. In order to provide a partial answer to 
this question, this paper describes the different outlooks between classical and neo-classical economists 
regarding value. It also examines and contrasts the economic approaches of Marx and Mill, whose way of 
thinking about social phenomena is still very relevant today. It also highlights the changes in scientific 
thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and how they affected economics.  
When these disparate aspects of economic thought and their development are considered together it 
becomes clearer why and how the environment is treated when economic analyses is applied to it. This is 
the case both in terms of explaining phenomena and in terms of the policy tools that economic theory and 
its application offer. It also becomes more clear how analysis of the environment developed over the last 
couple of centuries and that each development was based on previous modes of thought.  
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How does economics study the environment? This paper will attempt to answer 
this question; at least partially so. In order to do so it will explain the distinct ways in 
which classical and neo-classical economists consider value and it will contrast the 
economic approaches of Marx and Mill, both of whose way of thinking about social 
phenomena can still be discerned in today’s social science. It will also highlight the 
changes in scientific thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and show how 
all of these, when considered together, can provide helpful context to answering the 






The birth of Economics as a separate discipline is usually dated to 1776 when 
Adam Smith published "The Wealth of Nations". In Smith’s "The Wealth of Nations", 
various methods of reasoning are used. For instance, Chapter I: "Of the Division of 
Labor", could be seen as an early utilization of comparative statics whereas Chapter III: 
"Of the Origin and Use of Money", is more in line with a historical method.   
Ricardo, another highly influential figure in classical economics, writing in the 
beginning of the 19th century, departed from Smith in his method as he focused on 
analytical construction. While Smith's procedure was comprised of a combination 
between analytic methods, enclosed within a framework of historical analysis, Ricardo 
focused his work on constructing an analytical structure based on logical rigor and 
precision, discarding anything from the analysis considered not directly relevant to the 
problem at hand. This also led him to focus on a less general topic, namely surplus rents 
and profits, as opposed to Smith who concentrated on the evolution of the economic 
system as a whole (Roncaglia, 2001).  
While questions regarding economic methodology existed, specific treatment 
of these questions did not arise until the decade following Ricardo's death in 1823. 
Nassau William Senior's "Introductory Lecture on Political Economy", which discussed 
economic methodology, was published in 1826. In 1836, an updated version of Senior’s 
original work titled "Outline of the Science of Political Economy" was published as 
well as John Stuart Mill's essay "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the 
Method of Investigation Proper to It".1 
One of the main characteristics of this era of economic literature was that 
economists began to interpret themselves, to rationalize their own aims and procedures 
                                                
1 The fact that these are the first methodological texts referred to posits that earlier economists did not 
state them explicitly (Blaug, 1992).   
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- perhaps a sign of the growth of economics into an established science, and, as such, 
interested in questions of both method and scope (Schumpeter, 1994). 
Senior was the first to make the distinction between a science (theoretical) and 
an art (practical) of economics. In his 1826 essay, "Introductory Lecture on Political 
Economy", Senior states that the  
"…theoretic branch, that which explains the nature, production, and distribution 
of wealth, will be found to rest on a very few general propositions, which are the result 
of observation, or consciousness, and which almost every man, as soon as he hears 
them, admits, as familiar to his thoughts, or at least, as included in his previous 
knowledge... Many of its premises [the practical branch], indeed, rest on the same 
evidence as those of the first branch; for they are the conclusion of that branch: - but it 
has many which depend on induction from phenomena, numerous, difficult of 
enumeration, and of which the real sequence often differs widely from the apparent 
one." (Senior quoted in Bowley, 1937). 
 
Senior goes on to state that there are four basic tenets to the theoretic branch: 
every person desires to obtain as much wealth as possible, with as little sacrifice as 
possible; population tends to grow faster than the means of subsistence; capital and 
labor together could produce a positive net product; and "That agricultural skill 
remaining the same, additional Labor employed on the land within a given district 
produces in general a less proportionate return, or, in other words, that though, with 
every increase of the labor bestowed, the aggregate return is increased, the increase of 
the return is not in proportion to the increase in labor" (Ibid.). Senior derives his tenets 
by deduction - the first two mirror "human nature" and the latter two are based on 
empirical observation.  
In both Smith and Ricardo, there are no real references to environmental issues 
although they do allude to the problem of the supply of public goods. For example, 
Adam Smith understood that there were limits to markets as  
“…erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain public 
institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of 
individuals to erect or maintain; because the profit would never repay the expense to 
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any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more 
than repay it to a great society.” (Smith, 2003). 
  
Clear definitions of market failure and potential remediating policies would not 
come until later. While these economists were interested in the limits of growth, the 
driving force of their approach was population growth affecting economic 
consequences through redistribution of economic returns. Absolute resource constraints 
were unnecessary for their approach/theory (Spash, 1999). Malthus, a member of the 
classical school, was concerned with such issues. Per his theory of population, 
population increases exponentially while agriculture had decreasing returns (see last 
Senior tenet above). Thus, per Malthus, a reciprocal relationship between man and 
environment exists and population growth would bring about forces that would 
inevitably hold it in check (Sandmo, 2014). 
 
 To summarize, and generalize, classical economists were interested in 
macroeconomic issues, i.e. how the economy worked as a whole and how it grew over 
time. This is opposed to neo-classical economics, which focuses on decision-making 
processes of individuals and individual firms (Lumby, 2007). How did that change 




Value in the Classical Era 
According to Schumpeter “the problem of Value must always hold the pivotal 
position, as the chief tool of analysis in any pure theory that works with a rational 
schema.” (Schumpeter, 1994). Given that economics, and its theories, is the discipline 
that concentrates on how rational agents make rational decisions it makes sense to 
explore the building block of these theories, i.e. value. This section will be followed by 
two sections about classical political economists, Mill and Marx. While both based their 
respective approaches to social science / economics on value, they advanced very 
different interpretations of these phenomena.  
Classical political economists were not all agreed on how to measure value. 
However2, they distinguished between a market and natural price. They maintained that 
subjective desires and scarcity are important factors in determining market (or 
temporary or short-run) prices, but they also insisted that the natural (or equilibrium or 
long-run) prices were determined solely by relative costs of production (usually, 
relative labor costs). Furthermore, they made the distinction between reproducible and 
non-reproducible goods with the focus of theory being on reproducible goods. 
Heertje (2006), elaborates on Ricardo's distinction between reproducible and 
non-reproducible goods. Non-reproducible goods, like a Rembrandt painting, have a 
unique characteristic - they cannot be replicated. According to Ricardo, demand cannot 
explain their prices for it is unpredictable. On the other hand, reproducible goods have 
a natural price determined by their reproduction costs. When comparing this 
perspective to the utility theory of value, which is the base of neo-classical economic 
theory, it is interesting to think about the environment as being a non-reproducible 
good.  
                                                
2Based on Sowell (1974), however, this is a simplification. 
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Although classical economists differed in their interpretation of how to best 
measure value, they agreed on how to define it. The price of competitively sold 
commodities produced at constant cost was determined by their cost of production, 
while commodities produced at increasing cost were sold at marginal cost. 
Commodities which were sold in noncompetitive markets and those that were in fixed 
supply (non-reproducible for instance) were sold at prices determined by supply and 
demand (Sowell, 1974.). Supply and demand was the “general mechanism through 
which any particular determinant of value operated”. Thus, supply and demand was the 
regulating mechanism of price (Ibid.). 
Classical economists considered supply and demand as a causally neutral 
mechanism, similar in its neutrality to money, through which other variables 
determined value (Ibid.). According to Smith 
"The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and 
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of 
purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be 
called 'value in use'; the other, 'value in exchange'. The things which have the greatest 
value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those 
which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. 
Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything 
can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; 
but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it." 
(Smith, 2003).  
 
To Smith "The value of any commodity... to the person who possesses it, and 
who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, 
is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command. Labor, 
therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities" (Smith, 
2003). 
Mill, also reasoning according to such a labor theory of value, focused his 
attention on exchange value, for to Mill, “Value in use, or as Mr. De Quincey calls it, 
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teleologic value, is the extreme limit of value in exchange… The word Value, when 
used without adjunct, always means, in political economy, value in exchange… By the 
price of a thing, therefore we shall henceforth understand its value in money; by the 
value, or exchange value of a thing, its general power of purchasing; the command 
which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general.” (Mill, 2004). Mill 
emphasized that for economic theory the term value was essentially relative and that it 
meant only the exchange ratio between any two commodities or services. Price signified 
the exchange ratio between the (arbitrary) unit of any commodity and the good selected 
for money. According to Mill: “…the mere introduction of a particular mode of 
exchanging things for one another, by first exchanging a thing for money, and then 
exchanging the money for something else, makes no difference in the essential 
character of transactions… The relations of commodities to one another remain 
unaltered by money… Money is a commodity, and its value is determined like that of 
other commodities, temporarily by demand and supply, permanently and on the average 




Mill's Political Economy 
Mill, in his paper "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method 
of Investigation Proper to It" (Mill, 1968), maintains that economics is a branch of the 
science of speculative politics. As such, it does not treat the whole of man's nature as 
modified by the social state or of the conduct of man within society. Political Economy 
is based on a narrow perspective; knowingly it creates "fictional man" who is 
conceptualized 
"solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging 
of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end… It makes entire 
abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except those which may be 
regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, 
aversion to labor, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences… The 
science then proceeds to investigate the laws which govern these several operations." 
(Ibid). 
 
Mill adds the following caveat: "Not that any political economist was ever so 
absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the 
mode that in which science must necessarily proceed" (Ibid.).  
In his discussion of methodology, Mill3 introduces the deductive or method a 
priori. This method would dominate economic thought with regard to theory appraisal 
and practice until the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Vienna Circle started 
to influence scientific thought (Blaug, 1992). In many ways, however, Mill’s influence 
is still very much felt today. Mill distinguishes between two types of “reasoners” and 
between two inductive methods. The first are termed practical and the second theorists 
though both consult experience. The difference between the two is that:  
“those who are called practical men require specific experience, and argue 
wholly upwards from particular facts to a general conclusion; while those who are 
called theorists aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued 
upwards from particular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than 
that of the question under discussion, then argue downwards from that general principle 
to a variety of specific conclusions.” (Mill, 1968). 
                                                
3 Mill’s “Principles of Political Economy” would become the standard economics textbook until the turn of 
the century when Marshall’s “Principles of Economics” replaced it. 
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The first method of induction is the method a posteriori while the second is the 
method a priori. In order to arrive at a conclusion using the method a posteriori one 
needs not merely experience, but a specific experience. On the other hand, for the 
method a priori, one needs an hypothesis; this, to Mill, is “the essence of all science 
which admits to general reasoning at all” (Ibid.). Therefore, according to Mill: “Political 
economy reasons from assumed premises…premises which might be totally without 
foundation in fact … The conclusions of Political Economy, consequently, like those 
of geometry, are only true…in the abstract; that is, they are only true under certain 
suppositions…” (Ibid.).  
The difference between the method a priori and the method a posteriori is that 
the method a priori is an indirect inductive method. One first determines the laws 
governing individual causal factors.4 Having then determined the laws of the individual 
causes, one investigates their combined consequences deductively, each one on its own 
and then together. The last step is verifying the combined consequences. This testing 
serves as an indicator of whether any disturbing causes were not accounted for. This is 
where the method a posteriori comes in, it serves to verify. (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2012). Mill defines disturbing causes as follows: given that assumptions 
(reached by a deductive method of introspection utilizing psychological premises and 
abstracting from all noneconomic behavior (Blaug, 1992)) of a theory are correct, and 
correct conclusions are deduced from these assumptions, then these “would be as true 
in the abstract as those of mathematics; and would be as near an approximation as 
abstract truth can ever be…” (Mill, 1968). However, disturbing causes may exist and 
                                                
4The "laws" that one finds in Classical Political Economy are "Tendency Laws". According to Mill, a 
tendency is "a power acting with a certain intensity" in a certain "direction" (Mill, 1968). For an elaborate 
explanation of “Tendency Laws” see (Blaug, 1992) p. 59. Two of Marx's main arguments relied on 
assumptions related to tendencies: Marx, in both the analytical and historical sense, states that the 
increasing misery of the proletariat is brought about because the workers' share of the output declines; 
Marx also postulates the analytical tendency of the falling of the rate of profits (Sowell, 1974).    
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may not have fallen under the cognizance of the researcher. The political economist at 
this point must take them into account, “the disturbing causes … like friction in 
mechanics, to which they have often been compared… have their laws, as the cause 
which are thereby disturbed have theirs; and from the laws of the disturbing causes, the 
nature and amount of the disturbance may be predicted a priori… The effect of the 
special causes is then to be added to, or subtracted from, the effect of the general ones.” 
(Ibid.). The disturbing causes are, according to Mill, the only element of uncertainty in 
the process “an uncertainty inherent to the nature of these complex phenomena, and 
arising from the impossibility of being quite sure that all the circumstances of the 
particular case are known to us sufficiently in detail…” (Ibid.). Mill likens disturbing 
causes to friction in mechanics and they too can be predicted a priori. Because these 
effects are measurable, one may add or subtract them from the general ones. Mill 
maintains that we can never be assured that we have taken all factors into account, for 
“If the knowledge what are the particular causes operating in any given instance were 
revealed to us by infallible authority, then, if our abstract science were perfect, we 
should become profits. But the causes are not so revealed: they are to be collected by 
observation; and observation in circumstances of complexity is apt to be imperfect.” 
(Ibid.).  
With regard to verifying theory, Mill maintains that:  
"The discrepancy between our anticipations and the actual fact is often 
the only circumstance which would have drawn our attention to some important 
disturbing cause which we had overlooked. Nay, it often discloses to us errors 
in thought, still more serious than the omission of what can with any propriety 
be termed a disturbing cause. It often reveals to us that the basis itself of our 
whole argument is insufficient; that the data, from which we had reasoned, 
comprise only a part, and not always the important part, of the circumstances 




Mill advances verification of theory but he is not positing that a failure to verify 
a prediction should lead to a refutation of the underlying theory (Blaug, 1992). Given 
such an occurrence, a theory should not be discarded; it is only "insufficient".  
Mill then states the method of the practical philosopher that consists of two 
processes: the first analytical, the second synthetic. The practical philosopher must 
analyze society’s elements. Then, they must discern the different laws and their natural 
effects, each separately. Then, they must collect them to determine the effect of all the 
causes acting at once. Mill stresses the fact that this cannot be done completely because 
"mankind can never predict with absolute certainty, but only with a less or greater 
degree of probability." (Mill, 1968). 
In his book “A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive” (Mill, 2006), Mill 
discerns between two kinds of sociological inquiry. The first one (as elaborated upon 
above) deals with phenomena examined through cause and effect. The second inquiry 
has to do with “…the laws which determine those general circumstances themselves… 
what are the causes which produce, and the phenomena which characterize, States of 
Society generally.” (Ibid.). For Mill, the study of society is concerned with “intellectual 
and moral culture, existing in the community, and in every class of it; the state of 
industry, of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the community; their 
division into classes, and the relations of those classes to one another…” (Ibid.). Mill 
goes on to critically discuss a method of philosophizing in the social sciences which 
has “been of late years erected”, and that attempts “by a study and analysis of the 
general facts of history, to discover, (what these philosophers term), the laws of 
progress: which law, once ascertained, must according to them enable us to predict 
future events…” (Ibid.). However, Mill charges these philosophers with “a fundamental 
misconception of the true method of the social philosophy. The misconception consists 
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in supposing that the order of succession which we may be able to trace amount the 
different states of society and civilization which history presents to us… could ever 
amount to a law of nature. It can only be an empirical law.” (Ibid.). 
According to Blaug (Blaug, 1992), classical economists believed that true 
assumptions result in true conclusions, whereas simplified assumptions – as Mill 
knowingly makes with regard to economic man for example – lead to simplified 
conclusions and predictions. Disturbing causes are in fact substantive to the explanation 
of phenomena. Testing the application of theory determines whether enough of the 
disturbing causes are taken into account in the theory. Validity of a theory is irrelevant 
because the theory is true by virtue of being based on aspects of human behavior – 
which in turn is true by virtue of assumptions that are based on self-evident facts of 
human experience (Ibid.). 
 
One can offer critique to the a priori method on both logical and practical 
grounds. The logical criticism is aimed at the notion of ceteris paribus which Mill does 
not call by name but adopts. Scientifically, such a notion is vague and untestable, or not 
completely refutable by empirical testing. The practical criticism alleges that by 
regarding apparent disconfirmations as the result of a disturbing cause, the a priori 
method will end up justifying theories that have no practical use while in order to 
conduct policy one needs to know what will happen, not what would happen if there 
were no disturbing causes (Ibid.).  
According to Mill, the method one should utilize in social sciences is similar to 
the method used in mechanics. For instance, if one has a three-body system, it can be 
divided into three two-body systems. The forces affecting the two body systems, once 
aggregated, make it possible to ascertain knowledge of the way the three-body system 
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operates. Inference of the joint effects of the laws involves what Mill terms 
“ratiocination”. However, Mill does not take into account the fact that there may exist 
relations and correlations between the laws in the more complex system that are not the 
sum of those that operate in the simpler system. This means that the deduction of the 
law in the complex system also relies on an assumption relating to both the laws of the 
simpler system and to their relational structure that constitutes the complex system, as 
an aggregation of the simpler systems. This neglects the causal role of the relations that 
constitute the whole of the parts, or not taking into account social relations as relevant 
factors (SEP, 2012).  
 
To sum up Mill: the basic premises of political economy are deduced through 
introspective observation (wealth is desired as opposed to work) and/or through 
empirical observation ("law" of diminishing returns). Then, laws stating how specific 
causal factors operate are established. Classical economists know the major causes of 
economic phenomena but they are also aware that disturbing causes exist. The essence 
of classical political economy is to ascertain the correctness and confirmation of its 
basic premises - "laws". Finally, while a Science of Society also exists, it can only strive 




Marx’s Political Economy 
In Capital5, Marx focuses his attention on analyzing the system of production at 
the current time in history – capitalism. The unique feature of capitalism is production, 
enabled and based on division of labor. Production is the creation of commodities with 
the aim of selling commodities on the market. Thus, for Marx, the building block of 
capitalism is the commodity.  
Marx6 begins Capital by defining value. In the first chapter of Capital, Marx 
discerns between use value and exchange value. Use value “is conditioned by the 
physical properties of the commodity…” (Marx, 1990) and “is independent of the 
amount of labor required to appropriate its useful qualities.” (Ibid.). Exchange value is 
a quantitative relation or proportion “in which use values of one kind exchange for use 
values of another kind.” (Ibid.). For Marx, commodities are the “material bearers” of 
exchange value. Marx also maintains that quantitative and qualitative features of 
commodities commensurate to use and exchange values: “As use values, commodities 
differ above all in quality, while as exchange values they can only differ in quantity, 
and therefore do not contain an atom of use value.” (Ibid.).  
Marx, reasoning dialectically, makes several more definitions in the first chapter 
of Capital – for instance, from labor time, abstract labor and concrete labor are 
developed and defined. Abstract labor, or social labor, is the homogeneous mass of 
society’s labor rationed out in varying quantities in order to produce different 
commodities. The specific forms, such as carpentry, tailoring etc. are termed concrete 
labor (Sowell, 1985). For Marx, there existed an optimal amount of labor, which would 
                                                
5 The following discussion of Marx’s definition of value is based on his writings in Capital. 
6 Even though it is a crucial part for understanding Marx’s economics, I shall not go into the problem of 
transformation of values into prices. For analysis see (Hollander, 2008) p. 17-22 and (Roncaglia, 2003), 
chapter (16): Sraffa. I shall also not elaborate on Marx’s “Equalization of the General Rate of Profit 
through Competition” (Chapter 10, Capital III) which perhaps is almost as important for understanding 
competition and the market, although a brief sketch of what the market embodied to Marx appears 
below. For analysis see (Hollander, 2008), p. 31-38. 
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produce a price at equilibrium, termed by Marx as “socially necessary labor”.7 Socially 
necessary labor is comprised of two distinct components - one technological and the 
other economic (Ibid.). The technological component - “The labor time socially 
necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of 
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time.” 
The second component, the economic, defines necessary labor as “only the labor time 
which is required for the satisfaction of the social need (the demand).”(Ibid.). 
According to Marx, and opposing the classical economist’s conception, commodities 
did not necessarily exchange proportionally to their labor cost: “Average prices do not 
directly coincide with the values of the commodities, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, and 
others believe.” (Marx, 1990). Abstract and concrete labor, which flow into exchange 
value, develop into relative and equivalent value, which both flow into money - the 
universal equivalent.8 Marx’s constructions are building blocks for his analysis and, 
like the classical economists, he did not conceive of them as something that could be 
proved or disproved (Sowell, 1985). 
Marx’s discussion of value derives from his basic definition of the commodity, 
whereas the logical developments he makes are developed as dialectical relations - one 
definition flows into opposites that flow and form the base for the next set of 
oppositions etc. Marx is aware of the fact that different tasks demand different qualities 
from those that perform them. Per Marx: “more complex labor counts only as 
intensified, or rather multiplied simple labor… In the interests of simplification, we 
shall henceforth view every form of labor power as simple labor power; by doing this 
we shall simply be saving ourselves the trouble of making the reduction.” (Marx, 1990). 
                                                
7 For an explanation on the importance of this part of Marx’s analysis see (Hollander, 2008) p. 36. 
8 For an explanation on Money, Marx’s universal equivalent, see (Ishikura, 2004) p. 89.  
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Thus, and similar to Mill, Marx knowingly makes abstractions, though they are 
different from Mills’ natural laws. 
Marx continues: “commodities possess an objective character as values only in 
so far as they are expressions of an identical social substance, human labor, that their 
objective character as value is therefore purely social.” (Ibid.). In the end of Chapter 1, 
The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret, Marx states “… the labor of the private 
individual manifests itself as an element of the total labor of society only through the 
relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products… they appear as 
material relations between persons and social relations between things.” (Ibid.).  
According to Marx, “value “lies hidden behind” exchange value” (Sowell, 
1985). Marx makes several charges against classical economists, and against capitalism 
as the current mode of production: they fail to grasp “the hidden relations between value 
and its form, exchange value” (Ibid.); they confuse “the form of value with value itself”; 
and they fail to discover specifically how “value becomes exchange value.” (Marx in 
Sowell, 1985).  
 Exploitation is another feature of capitalism. In order to “prove” exploitation, 
Marx discerns between labor and labor power. Labor is similar to concrete labor (a 
specific productive activity) whereas labor power is the worker as a person, 
incorporating the potential to exercise a productive activity (Roncaglia, 2001). The 
laborer sells their labor power as a commodity and the capitalist pays for it at its value. 
The costs correspond to the means of subsistence that are required to keep the worker 
alive. If an economic system produces a surplus, it follows that the amount of labor 
supplied by the laborers is higher than what they are paid in the form of subsistence 
wages. Thus, two parts emerge – necessary labor, the labor necessary to produce the 
means of subsistence for all the workers in the economy and surplus labor. The surplus 
17 
 
labor is the difference between total social labor and necessary labor (Ibid.). For Marx, 
exploitation is structurally built into a system with an economic surplus because 
workers work more than what they receive, as embodied in their wages - exploitation 
can exist even if workers receive higher wages than subsistence wages (Roemer, 2005).  
One outcome of such a discrepancy is the accumulation of capital resulting from 
unpaid labor. The “law of accumulation” is Marx’s exposition of the cause that leads to 
the eventual collapse of capitalism. With the increase in aggregate capital, a change 
also occurs in its technological composition where the “constant” capital (equipment 
and raw materials) increase disproportionately to the “variable” capital (wages). This is 
followed by the enactment of labor saving devices that, in turn, result in a saving of 
labor accumulated in the form of unwanted laborers that comprise an “industrial reserve 
army”. Combining these developments with demographic postulations of an increasing 
population, it follows that the purchasing power of the laborers falls and that the market 
is subject to a glut of overproduction and thus to commercial crises and depressions. 
This is followed by the inevitable development and arrival of socialism by way of a 
conscious class movement (Veblen, 1906). 
Another concept introduced by Marx is profit upon alienation which is 
represented by the following scheme: M – C – M’, with M indicating money, C 
indicating commodities and M’ indicating a larger amount of money compared to M, 
thus violating the rule of exchange of equals.9 
For Marx, the market, while constituting a necessary place for the connection 
of workers, operates in such a way that commodities become fetishes. In capitalism, the 
market is necessary as it allows for the allocation of both the means of production and 
the means of subsistence. These are crucial to the survival and reproduction of both 
                                                
9 This will be elaborated upon when discussing the Marginal Revolution. 
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individuals and for the system as a whole. Each worker contributes to the social product 
with their activity, and hence to the welfare of society. However, Marx maintains that 
these benevolent traits are obscured and hidden for they are diverted from their true end 
by commodity fetishism. Marx’s conclusion is based on his postulation that in 
capitalism the market makes it appear as though the ultimate end of every individual is 
ownership of exchange values. However, society suffers from social stratification 
because the productive processes are controlled by capitalists, as opposed to belonging 
to society as a whole (Roncaglia, 2001).  
 
According to Mill’s typology of the sociological sciences, the reciprocal 
relation between Marx’s study of society and investigation of capitalism are 
intertwined, thus they cross the borders of what he defined as two distinct modes of 
political speculation. Mill claimed that laws could only be discerned in political 
economy, whereas in the study of society only empirical regularities could be arrived 
at. Laws had tendencies, but these were correct only insofar as they were laws of nature. 
Empirical regularities were not laws, thus, repeating Mill’s quote, a “misconception 
consists in supposing that the order of succession which we may be able to trace amount 
the different states of society and civilization which history presents to us… could ever 
amount to a law of nature” (Mill, 2006). Marx combines his theory’s laws into the study 
of society. Marx would disregard Mill’s critique as Marx could claim that his postulates 
merely serve him as a starting point in his analysis of the first approximation in Capital 




The Marginal Revolution  
In 1875, John Elliot Cairnes would sum up the essence of classical political 
economy in his “Character and Logical Method of Political Economy". This is fifty 
years after the death of Ricardo but the basic tenets on which classical political 
economy rested remained intact. In his book, Cairnes concludes that "[Economic laws] 
can be refuted only by showing either that the principles and conditions assumed do not 
exist, or that the tendency which the law affirms does not follow as a necessary 
consequence from this assumption" (Cairnes as quoted in Blaug, 1992). In Senior, in 
Mill, in Cairnes and in Jevons, verification does not mean testing the validity of a 
theory. Verification is only a method of establishing a boundary to the application of a 
theory deemed true. The only reason to conduct an a posteriori test is in order to 
discover whether disturbing causes exist. If they do, then the theory was applied 
wrongly but the theory itself is true. An even stronger statement can be made about the 
perception of economic science at the time: the question of whether there was any way 
of showing a logically consistent theory to be false was never even contemplated (Ibid.). 
This period also represents the beginning of the "marginal revolution".10 The 
marginal revolution would set the stage for shifting the focus of economics from macro 
to micro. For example, economists became more interested in analyzing firm behavior 
in competition as opposed to trying to understand the economy as a whole. This was 
made possible by combining Utilitarianism and mathematics. So, while Mill, and other 
classical economists, knew about and acknowledged market failures they did not have 
rigorous enough tools to develop their thoughts. Working around the turn of the century, 
Marshal would introduce a more rigorous discussion of externalities based on marginal 
utility because by that time he had the tools to do so. Externalities can be positive or 
                                                
10Similar to the "industrial revolution", it took about sixty years for the revolution to fully materialize.  
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negative, and they represent repercussions of decisions made by individuals or firms 
that are not taken into account when decisions are made. Pigou, Marshal’s successor at 
Cambridge, would lay the groundwork for the modern field of environmental 
economics in the 1920’s by formalizing the concept of externalities in consumption. 
Pigou distinguished between private and social marginal net products. Practically 
speaking, this means that a factory that emits smoke and harms consumers imposes a 
social marginal cost on the community in excess of its private marginal cost (Sandmo, 
2014). To fix this, one may impose a tax on polluting that would affect the incentives 
that the firm faces. This, in turn, may lead the firm to recalculate how much harm it 
causes because it now must take into account higher production costs. Another way to 
think about this is to think about driving. Cars need gas but cars also harm the 
environment. By applying a tax on gas, an individual consumer must consider a higher 
cost when using their car, which, under certain assumptions about behavior, will lead 
them to use it less. Such a policy instrument is known as a Pigouvian tax. 
The marginal revolution was so important that it warranted a new name for 
classical economics - neo-classical economics. One way to understand neo-classical 
economics is to think of it as the "science of exchange". This means that it addresses 
all economic phenomena in the same manner: it reduces the problem to one of 
exchange, and it then searches for the equilibrium exchange ratio. Neo-classical 
economics represents the utility theory of value supplanting the labor theory of value. 
It also meant that a purely subjective perception of value was introduced into economics 
and it allowed for a broadening of the scope of economics for it was no longer bound 
to the parsimonious labor theory of value. However, it also ushered in an alteration in 
the metaphysical perception of both things and activity, which influenced and changed 
economics, and society, deeply.  
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According to Miekle11 (Maki, 2001), the English language has been penetrated 
by economic or market conceptions. “Things” are naturally occurring entities or 
artifacts, which persist through change and whose identities are bound to a continuous 
path that can be traced through time (Ibid.). Value in use is a notion that served as a 
base in the work of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. As such, it was commensurate with the 
idea of an artifact or of a useful thing. Mill, as quoted earlier, started to obscure the 
distinction between value in use and value in exchange, and Jevons later shifted the 
focus of value from usefulness in consumption to usefulness in buying and selling 
(Ibid.). Eventually, the notion of value in use was replaced by the notion of utility. 
These shifts also mirror the developments in scientific thought that were 
occurring at the time (to be elaborated upon below). Jevons thought that the presence 
of qualitative notions in economics was wrong and that they stood in the way of 
quantification. Thus, he introduced utility as the notion of usefulness. However, utility 
is severed from the idea of a thing or artifact and it is generic and uncategorized. 
Usefulness and utility are an economic construct and they can be common to all things. 
Usefulness becomes uniform and homogenous, just like money or exchange value - 
usefulness in use is subordinated to usefulness in exchange, or buying and selling 
(Ibid.).  
Marshall, at the turn of the century, asserts that: 
“The word value says Adam Smith has two different meanings, and sometimes 
expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing 
other goods which the possession of that object conveys. But experience has shown that 
it is not well to use the word in the former sense. The value, that is the exchange value, 
of one thing in terms of another at any place and time, is the amount of that second 
thing which can be got there and then in exchange for the first. Thus the term value is 
relative, and expresses the relation between two things at a particular place and time”. 
(Ibid.). 
                                                
11This part, until Keynes’s quote, including the quotes as they appear within, is almost completely based 
on Miekle, Scott,  “Quality and Quantity in Economics: the Metaphysical Construction of the Economic 
Realm”, in (Maki, 2001).  
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Marx, as mentioned, made the distinction between the qualitative and 
quantitative features of the commodity (value in use versus value in exchange). 
However, Wicksteed argued that the concept of utility has made such discernment 
redundant: “What we really have to do is to put out of consideration the concrete and 
specific qualitative utilities in which they [useful things] differ, leaving only the abstract 
and general quantitative utility in which they are exchanged.” (Ibid.) 
This alteration in notions changes the framing of questions. For instance, what 
is the end of the market economy? Marx and John Maynard Keynes held that the end 
of the market system is the accumulation of money as opposed to the accumulation of 
things (Ibid.). If utility is the only end then such a distinction, even if wrong, cannot be 
made within its framework. For example, Keynes wrote that the national dividend 
“measures the volume of current output or real income and not the value of output or 
money income.” It depends on net output and “on the net addition... to the resources of 
the community available for consumption.” (Ibid.).  
 Keynes was also concerned with wealth as money:  
“The distinction between a cooperative economy and an entrepreneur economy 
bears some resemblance to a pregnant observation made by Karl Marx, - though the 
subsequent use to which he put this observation was highly illogical. He pointed out 
that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem to suppose, 
a case of C – M – C’, i.e. of exchanging commodity (or effort) for money in order to 
obtain another commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private 
consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is a case of M - C – M’, i.e. of 
parting with money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money.” (Ibid).  
 
Marx borrowed that distinction from Aristotle who made it the basis of his 
analysis of the market economy. According to Aristotle, actions are defined by their 
ends, thus if two activities have different ends they are different activities. C – M – C’ 
aims at getting useful things whereas M – C – M’ is pursued for the sake of money. The 
second behavior has no natural end. There is no difference of quality between one sum 
of money and another, the only difference is that of quantity. To Aristotle, the second 
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mode means that: “there is no limit to the end it seeks… the end it seeks is the mere 
acquisition of money.” (Ibid.) Through this lens, there is no ability to discern between 
reproducible or non-reproducible goods, all fall into one category usurped by utility. 
John Neville Keynes's "The Scope and Method of Political Economy" (1891) 
was also published during this era. In it, he makes the distinction between a positive 
and a normative study of economics. This distinction is important in order to understand 
the way that neo-classical economists perceive economic science and themselves. In 
order to do so he gives the following example:  
"Thus, in regard to the payment of interest, we have, first, the positive inquiries 
why, under certain conditions of industry, interest is paid at all, and what determines 
the rate paid. We have, secondly, the inquiries whether interest ought to be paid, and, 
if it ought, what constitutes a fair rate of interest… Intimate as are the connexions 
between the above kinds of inquiry, they are in themselves distinct in character, and 
belong to different departments in the classification of knowledge. The first belongs to 
positive science, the second to normative or regulative science… As the terms here are 
used, a positive science may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge 
concerning what is; a normative or regulative science as a body of systematized 
knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and concerned therefore with the 
ideal as distinguished from the actual; an art as a system of rules for the attainment of 
a given end." (Keynes, 1917). 
The developments above, together with developments in scientific thought, set 




Developments in Scientific Thought and Their Effect on Economic Thought 
Important developments in scientific thought are also occurring at the turn of 
the 20th century. Three developments that would influence economic thought are those 
of Mach, Duhem and Hempel. 
According to Mach, the purpose of science is to give the most economical 
description of nature as possible, for the goal of science is to provide conceptions which 
can help one better orient oneself to the world: "in short a world picture of the greatest 
possible stability." (SEP, 2012). Mach asserted that all scientific theories and 
hypotheses are condensed descriptions of natural events, neither true nor false in 
themselves but simply conventions for storing empirical information (Blaug, 1992). 
Duhem maintained that: "The analysis we have given of experiments in physics shows 
fact to be completely interpenetrated by theoretical interpretation, to the point where it 
becomes impossible to express fact in isolation from theory." (SEP, 2012). Duhem 
posited that no individual scientific hypothesis is conclusively falsifiable for one cannot 
separate the particular hypothesis from its auxiliary statements (Blaug, 1992). This 
argument is known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. Popper's scientific method, introduced 
into economics by Hutchison, combined with the hypothetico-deductive method (HD) 
(explanation follows) of scientific explanation was formulated in order to deal with this 
problem. 
Hempel was the first to formalize the HD model for the testing of scientific 
theories. Hempel and Oppenheim stated that all truly scientific explanations have a 
logical structure: they involve at least one universal law plus a statement of relevant 
initial or boundary conditions that constitute the explanans or premises from which the 
explanandum – a statement about an event, whose explanation one is seeking - is 
deduced with the rules of deductive logic. Moreover, from the common logical structure 
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of scientific explanation, it follows that the operation called explanation involves the 
same rules of logical inference as the operation of prediction - the difference being the 
relative time of the event, with regard to the time of the hypothesis. In other words, 
citing a particular cause as an explanation of an event simply demands placing the event 
in question under some universal law. In the case of prediction, one starts with a 
universal law plus a set of initial conditions, from them one deduces a statement about 
an unknown event. The prediction is used in order to see whether the universal law is 
in fact upheld. According to this approach, explanation is prediction written backwards. 
This is also known as the symmetry thesis or the covering law of model of explanation 
(Blaug, 1992). 
Another major change in scientific thought occurred with regard to the way the 
scientific method should proceed. As mentioned, Mill's method a priori rested on laws 
deduced from introspection. The HD method came to replace this older notion and 
introduced a new commitment to empiricism. Mill's method only utilized the method a 
posteriori in order to verify that all disturbing causes had been taken into account 
whereas the HD method demands empirical confirmation or non-confirmation of an 
hypothesis.  
The first step in the HD method is to formulate an hypothesis. The second is to 
deduce a "prediction" or observable claim conjoined with other statements. These 
statements should include descriptions of initial conditions, other theories and ceteris 
paribus clauses. Following, one tests by experimentation or by observation. Finally, 
one must judge if the hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed. This is dependent on 
whether the initial prediction is true or false. "Confirmed" does not mean "proven" or 
"true" and "disconfirmed" does not mean "disproven" or "false". This method preceded 
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the logical positivists but came to be a central feature of their program (Hausman, 
1992). 
The HD method allows one to formulate the problems of theory assessment in 
economics. For instance, in order to test the economic hypothesis of the law of demand, 
which states that a change in the price of the commodity causes (ceteris paribus) a 
change in the quantity demanded in the opposite direction, then one could test this 
hypothesis on the price of gasoline by conducting an experiment and verifying that if 
the price of gasoline goes up people will demand less of it. This is based on (a) the law 
of demand (b) a statement describing a price change (c) ceteris paribus assumptions 
and (d) assumptions about the reliability of the statistical data one is using. Following, 
one observes whether the prediction is true. A major problem in economics arises with 
regard to the last step, deciding whether the evidence supports the hypothesis, for in 
economics various disturbing causes exist (Ibid.).  
In 1938, Terence Hutchison published "The Significance and Basic Postulates 
of Economic Theory". With it came the explicit introduction into economics of Popper's 
methodological criterion of falsifiability. This meant that for an economic proposition 
to aspire to the status of "science" it must, at least conceivably, be put to an empirical 
test (Blaug, 1992). This came as a retort to the method a priori, which was still 
advanced by various economists including Mises and Robbins who continued to stress 
the importance of the method a priori. Robbins, in "An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science" argues that: 
"The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are obviously 
deductions from a series of postulates… The main postulate of the theory of value is 
the fact that individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so… 
The main postulate of the theory of dynamics is the fact that we are not certain regarding 
future scarcities. These are not postulates the existence of whose counterpart in reality 
admits of extensive dispute once their nature is fully realized. We do not need controlled 
experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our everyday 
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experience that they have only to be stated to be recognized as obvious" (Robbins, 
1984).   
 
 At the center of Hutchison's argument is the notion that all economic 
propositions can and should be classified either into tautological propositions or into 
empirical ones. This goes hand in hand with the positivist's idea that all statements can 
be divided into logically necessary – "analytic" propositions, and logically 
indeterminate – "synthetic" ones. Hutchison's methodological prescription is that 
scientific economic enquiries should be confined to empirically testable statements. 
Given, he is vague on the question of whether the requirement of testability refers to 
the assumptions or to the predictions of economic theory (Blaug, 1992).  
This is another key point in time in the transformation of the method and basic 
postulations of economics. Mill’s method a priori is based on assumptions, or laws, 
and proving or disproving them is irrelevant to the basic premises that they are laws, 
therefore they are true. Empirical testing only highlights the fact that disturbing causes 
exist but serves as no basis for refuting or disproving the underlying theory. On the 
other hand, Hutchison is advocating a purely positivist demand on economics.  
Reconciliation of economics with Popper's idea of falsification and with the HD 
method and with the Duhem-Quine thesis is brought about by one of the most important 
methodological statements written in economics,12 Milton Friedman's essay "The 
Methodology of Positive Economics" (Friedman, 1966).  
Prior to Friedman's essay, various economists tried to conduct empirical 
experiments to verify basic economic tenets. For instance, Lester tried to determine 
whether firms attempt to maximize expected returns. These tests attracted attention and 
                                                
12According to Hausman, Freidman's essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" is by far the 
most influential methodological statement of this century. It is the only essay on methodology that a 
large number, perhaps a majority, of economists have ever read." (Hausman, 1992). 
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provoked angry responses. Friedman's essay appeared to offer a way out of such 
empirical difficulties and criticism (Hausman, 1992).  
After distinguishing between positive and normative economics, as Keynes did, 
Friedman asserts that the role of a positive science is exclusively predictive, as opposed 
to the symmetry thesis, which views explanation as prediction and vice versa. 
Moreover, Friedman claims that economists seek significant and useable predictions, 
not understanding or explanation (Ibid.). Thus, for Friedman, economics as a science 
should be instrumental. A theory, which enables one to make a reliable prediction, is a 
good theory. According to Friedman, there is no other test of a theory. For example, it 
does not matter whether its "assumptions" are "unrealistic" (Hausman, 2008). When 
Friedman mentions assumptions, he means both fundamental assertions (consumers 
maximize utility) and additional premises (cigarettes of different brands are perfect 
substitutes). An unrealistic assumption could mean that the basic assertion may not be 
true, perhaps not even approximately true, with regard to the phenomena to which the 
theory is applied to. Friedman can then argue that researchers such as Lester are 
mistaken when they attempt to assess the assumptions of economic theory instead of its 
predictions. There is no point in examining assumptions of a theory if it is possible to 
do a "total" assessment of its performance with respect to the phenomena it was 
designed to explain (Ibid).13 Thus, by the 1950s, political economy, now called 
economics, completed a full turn. In one hundred years, it went from a method wishing 
to ascertain the correctness and confirmation of its basic premises - "laws", to a science 
of prediction. 
Koopmans sums up these developments with regard to the assessment of theory: 
                                                
13This perspective is problematic in many ways and as such it received much critique. For two critiques 
see Hausman, "Why Look Under the Hood?" and Simon, "Testability and Approximation", both in 
Hausman (2008).  
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"Whether the postulates are placed beyond doubt [Robbins], or whether doubts 
concerning their realism are suppressed by the assertion that verification can and should 
be confined to the hard-to-unravel more distant effects [Friedman] – in either case the 
argument surrounds and shields received economic theory with an appearance of 
invulnerability which is neither fully justified nor at all needed. The theories that have 
become dear to us can very well stand by themselves as an impressive and highly 
valuable system of deductive thought, erected on a few premises that seem to be well-
chosen first approximations to a complicated reality. They exhibit in a striking manner 
the power of deductive reasoning in drawing conclusions which, to the extent one 
accepts their premises, are highly relevant to questions of economic policy. In many 
cases the knowledge these deductions yield is the best we have, either because better 
approximations have not been secured at the level of the premises, or because 
comparable reasoning from premises recognized as more realistic has not been 
completed or has not yet been found possible. Is any stronger defense needed, or even 





Environmental and Ecological Economics 
Mill’s writing acknowledged the problem of supplying public goods as well as 
the importance of the environment. Per Mill: 
“…is there the earth itself, its forests and waters, and all other natural riches, 
above and below the surface? These are the inheritance of the human race, and there 
must be regulations for the common enjoyment of it. What rights, and under what 
conditions, a person shall be allowed to exercise over any portion of this common 
inheritance cannot be left undecided. No function of government is less optional than 
the regulation of these things, or more completely involved in the idea of civilized 
society.” (Mill, 2004) 
 
With that, as described earlier, it took quite a while from the time of his writing 
to develop the framework that enables economists to deal with environmental 
questions. In fact, economic literature, until the middle of the 20th century, had little to 
no concern for resource depletion or environmental issues (Spash, 1999). While it did 
develop ideas relating to conservation issues in agriculture and forestry, it considered 
those from a wise-use perspective as opposed to preservation. Agricultural economics 
developed during this period, and it produced, for example, work on soil conservation. 
Mainstream neo-classical economics, however, developed theories that assumed that 
economies could operate independently of natural resource constraints so 
environmental issues were marginalized (Ibid.). 
It is only in the last four decades that economics has shown interest in the 
reciprocal relationship between economic activity and the environment. Two categories 
of environmental issues have been at the center of environmental economics. The first 
is the depletion of natural resources and the second is pollution (Lumby, 2007).  
Hotelling, in 1931, introduced his theory of the mine in which he described 
optimal non-renewable resource depletion (Spash, 1999). However, it would take 
several decades for Hotelling’s approach to discounting to become accepted. The key 
concept in his theory is that depletion is defined as follows: the opportunity cost of what 
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you extract today is production at a future date. According to his model, if one assumes 
competition and if the social rate of discount equals the market rate of interest then 
there would not be over extraction of resources. Asking the question of what is the 
optimal rate of resource exploitation highlights two key economic concepts, common 
property and uncertainty (Lumby, 2007). Both are important because in the case of 
common property there will be a tendency to over extract, exacerbated by uncertainty 
regarding the future. When looking to policy instruments to curb over extraction, 
Pigouvian taxation, as elaborated upon earlier, is one method that can alter the 
calculations firms face.  
Pollution is usually given as the classic example of negative externalities. As 
discussed earlier, rational polluters will not factor pollution into their production costs. 
Such a scenario is defined as a market failure because there is no market price 
mechanism that can assist in regulation. This problem arises in the supply of “public 
goods” more generally because everyone can enjoy them but without enforcement, no 
one will pay for them. Most economists would recommend applying Pigouvian taxation 
though practically speaking ascertaining the accurate amount of taxes to impose can be 
difficult (Ibid.). 
Much criticism can be made when applying the economic worldview to social 
questions. However, Oates claims that economics actually provides useful insights 
relevant to environmental protection (Oates, 2005). The first is that economic analysis 
is quite clear about the fact that an unregulated market system will lead to excessive 
pollution. This happens because the market allows for “overuse” of the environment. It 
follows that an economic argument could be made for intervention through 
environmental regulation. Economics can also provide helpful tools to calculate 
possible answers to the question of how clean should the environment be. This is 
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possible because micro economic theory focuses on equalizing marginal benefits to 
marginal costs. In any case, even if marginal analysis is not used towards this end, 
economics can provide helpful insights into possible results of public policy (bid.). 
Marx also considered the environment, albeit in a different way. Per Marx: 
“Capitalist production…disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the 
earth, i.e. prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in 
the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting 
fertility of the soil…. The social combination and organization of the labor processes 
is turned into an organized mode of crushing out the workman’s individual vitality, 
freedom and independence.… Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a 
progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress 
in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the 
more long-lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its development on 
the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more rapid 
is this process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore, develops 
technology…only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the 
worker.” (Marx, 1990) 
 
An interesting connection can be between Marx’s critique of capitalism and the 
growth of ecological economics over the last few decades. According to Costanza 
(quoted in Lumby, 2007), ecological economics “is intended to be a new approach to 
both ecology and economics, that recognizes the need to make economics more 
cognizant of ecological impacts and dependencies, the need to make ecology more 
sensitive to economic forces, incentives and constraints, and the need to treat integrated 
economic-ecological systems with a common (but diverse) set of conceptual and 
analytical tools.”  
While there are various strands within ecological economics, two tenets 
distinguish it from neo-classical economics. Ecological economics recognizes that 
humans and their social spheres, including the economy, are part of a larger natural 
ecosystem, the earth’s biosphere. This means that the environment is not a subset of the 
economy but that the economy is a subset of the global environment (Harris, quoted in 
Lumby, 2007). The second tenet that distinguishes it from neo-classical economics 
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relates to the question of whether unlimited economic growth is attainable, or whether 
the more achievable goal should be a “steady state” economy (Daly as quoted in 
Lumby, 2007). 
Ecological economics could be characterized as a movement and less so a clear 
cut discipline because its interdisciplinary requirements make it difficult to define its 
core methodology. According to Holling et al (quoted in Spash, 1999), four key features 
are common to the structure of ecosystems that economists should take into account. 
These are:  
- Change is episodic as opposed to continuous and gradual (i.e. hurricanes) 
- Moving from micro to macro is not a linear process 
- Ecosystems may have numerous equilibria, they may lack equilibria or they 
may be destabilized by forces that are far from equilibria.  
- Due to these complexities, management and policies must be flexible 
 
Additional features that ecological economics espouses are the importance that it 
assigns to incorporating moral values into the discussion. This includes debating the set 
of morally considerable entities, what rights do future generations have and how the 
poor should be treated (Spash, 1999). Applying economic analysis to such questions is 
difficult, but the moral and philosophical essence of economics, Utilitarianism, does 
provide a coherent outlook on such issues. However, many economists perceive of 
themselves as engineers who solve problems and do not necessarily take such 
considerations into account, nor do they think of the discipline as actually holding a 
moral position on such issues.  
According to Lumby (2007), the emergence of ecological economics can be seen 
as a macro-economic complement to the helpful microeconomic foundations of 
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environmental economics. Ecological economics, which at its base is interdisciplinary, 
can also be seen as an attempt to collect different elements that share a common purpose 
and try to answer a similar question: what are the ways in which the demand of the 
modern economy can be combined with the bio-physical constraints that are inherent 





This paper set out to try and answer the question of how does economics study 
the environment? In order to provide a partial answer to this question, it described the 
different outlook between classical and neo-classical economists regarding value. It 
also examined and contrasted the economic approaches of Marx and Mill, whose way 
of thinking about social phenomena is still very relevant today. It also highlighted the 
changes in scientific thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and how they 
affected economics.  
When these disparate aspects of economic thought and their development are 
taken together it becomes clearer why and how the environment is considered when 
economic analyses is applied to it. This is the case both in terms of explaining 
phenomena and in terms of the policy tools that economic theory and application offer. 
It also becomes clearer how analysis of the environment developed over the last couple 
of centuries and that each development was based on previous modes of thought. There 
is surely much more that can be discerned about my question by further research and 
reading into the history of economic thought. 
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